Journal

Volume 13, Issue 1 (March 31, 2012)

4 articles

• How to Integrate Representation into Computational Modeling, and Why We Should
  by Michael Rescorla
  J. CS. 2012, 13(1), 1-38;
  Abstract I argue that Chalmers’s proposed computational foundation conflicts with contemporary cognitive science. I present an alternative approach to modeling the mind computationally. On my alternative approach, computational models can individuate mental states in representational terms, without any appea... [Read more].
  Abstract I argue that Chalmers’s proposed computational foundation conflicts with contemporary cognitive science. I present an alternative approach to modeling the mind computationally. On my alternative approach, computational models can individuate mental states in representational terms, without any appeal to organizationally invariant properties. I develop my approach through case studies drawn from cognitive psychology, CS, and AI.  [Collapse]
• Metaphysics and Computational Cognitive Science: Let’s Not Let the Tail Wag the Dog
  by Frances Egan
  J. CS. 2012, 13(1), 39-49;
  Abstract David Chalmers characterizes the central commitments of computational cognitive science in terms of two theses: computational suf ficiency, the idea that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and computational explanation, the idea that computation provides... [Read more].
  Abstract David Chalmers characterizes the central commitments of computational cognitive science in terms of two theses: computational suf ficiency, the idea that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and computational explanation, the idea that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes and behavior. The computational program has been challenged by Hilary Putnam (1988) and John Searle (1991), who argue that every physical system implements every computation, with the consequence that any computational ‘explanation’ of cognition is utterly trivial. What is needed, according to Chalmers, is an account of implementation, which would both answer the Searle/Putnam challenge and provide a foundation for computational cognitive theorizing. In this paper I argue that computational cognitive models typically do not satisfy Chalmers’ notion of implementation, and so his account does not provide a conceptual foundation for computational theorizing as it is actually practiced. I argue further that the ‘in-principle’ possibility of deviant implementations of the Putnam/Searle sort does not undermine that practice – it does not make computational explanation trivial – though seeing why it doesn’t requires that we take account of the use to which a computation is put in the exercise of a cognitive capacity. [Collapse]
• Combinatorial-State Automata and Models of Computation
  by Curtis Brown
  J. CS. 2012, 13(1), 51-73;
  Abstract David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial- state automaton” or CSA. It is not entirely clear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a full-blown computational model, or merely a convenien... [Read more].
  Abstract David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial- state automaton” or CSA. It is not entirely clear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a full-blown computational model, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent algorithms, and because they are too powerful both in that they can perform any computation in a single step and in that without so far unspecified restrictions they can “compute” the uncomputable. In addition, I suggest that finite, inputless CSAs have trivial implementations very similar to those they were introduced to avoid. [Collapse]
• What it is not to Implement a Computation: A Critical Analysis of Chalmers’ Notion of Implemention
  by Matthias Scheutz
  J. CS. 2012, 13(1), 75-106;
  Abstract In this paper, we introduce what can be called the “standard account of implementation” and briefly mention some objections raised against it. Then we carefully examine Chalmers’ account of implementation and show that without a notion of “legitimate grouping of physical states” all sorts of physica... [Read more].
  Abstract In this paper, we introduce what can be called the “standard account of implementation” and briefly mention some objections raised against it. Then we carefully examine Chalmers’ account of implementation and show that without a notion of “legitimate grouping of physical states” all sorts of physical systems would implement unintended computations. Specifically, we show how, despite Chalmers’ attempts to overcome the difficulties inherent in defining physical state types, his definition of implementation still allows for unwanted implementations. [Collapse]