Journal

Volume 14, Issue 2 (June 30, 2013)

5 articles

• Editorial Note for the Special Issue (I and II)
  by Liza Skidelsky & Gualtiero Piccinini
  J. CS. 2013, 14(2), 0-0;
  Abstract The papers included in this issue (I and II) were presented at the III Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science held in Buenos Aires in November 2012. Based on the idea that empirical research illuminates philosophical problems of the mind while philosophical reflection contributes to the develo... [Read more].
  Abstract The papers included in this issue (I and II) were presented at the III Workshop on Philosophy and Cognitive Science held in Buenos Aires in November 2012. Based on the idea that empirical research illuminates philosophical problems of the mind while philosophical reflection contributes to the development of theories in cognitive science, this workshop aims to create a biennial forum to discuss the problems that lie at the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science. Computationalism, mechanism and psychological explanation were some of the topics discussed at this workshop. The papers included in this special issue address these topics with the goal of informing the ongoing debate in philosophy of science – particularly in the philosophy of neuroscience and cognitive science – between the advocates of mechanistic explanations and those who adhere to functional explanations of cognitive capacities. [Collapse]
• Faculty of Language, Functional Models, and Mechanisms
  by Liza Skidelsky
  J. CS. 2013, 14(2), 111-149;
  Abstract In a recent series of papers, John Collins has challenged the dominant epistemic view of Chomsky’s faculty of language (FL), which holds that the FL consists fundamentally of propositional knowledge. Collins presents the architectural view that holds that the FL is a computational information-proces... [Read more].
  Abstract In a recent series of papers, John Collins has challenged the dominant epistemic view of Chomsky’s faculty of language (FL), which holds that the FL consists fundamentally of propositional knowledge. Collins presents the architectural view that holds that the FL is a computational information-processing system. I fully endorse this broad architectural perspective. Nonetheless, I would like to discuss one aspect of his architectural view which maintains that we should not understand the FL as a causal mechanism, that is, as part of a causal nexus. In this paper, I will try to develop the main lines of an alternative, though perhaps broadly compatible, way of unfolding the architectural perspective in which it makes sense to think of an aspect of the minimalist program as a cognitive functional model that nevertheless describes a causal mechanism. I will argue that there are no compelling reasons to discard the possibility of conceiving the FL as a causal mechanism (albeit an idealized one) of the same nature as the mechanisms which any scientific theory about cognitive architecture attempts to explain. The model in and of itself is not a mechanistic one in that it only specifies the functional properties of its object of description, leaving aside structural properties such as location, temporal order of processing, and the like. Still, the object being described, the FL, can be conceived of as a mechanism. Unlike the advocates of mechanistic explanations, I will argue that there are cognitive mechanisms that can have a genuine functional explanation (i.e. that do not constitute a ‘mechanism sketch’) depending on the correspondence that can be achieved between the cognitive model and the cognitive mechanism. If the correspondence between the entities, activities, and organization postulated by the cognitive model is direct or straightforward regarding the entities, activities, and organization of the mechanism, then there are good chances of obtaining a mechanistic explanation; one in which not only the functional, but also the structural, properties of the mechanism are specified. If, on the other hand, the correspondence is indirect, as in the case of the FL mechanism, the functional explanation appears to be the most adequate to the extent that it highlights the relevant explanatory characteristics of the mechanism. [Collapse]
• A Problem for the Mechanistic Account of Computation
  by Sabrina Haimovici
  J. CS. 2013, 14(2), 111-149;
  Abstract The mechanistic account of computation proposes that computational explanation is mechanistic, i.e. it explains the behavior and capacities of mechanisms in terms of their components and the functions and organization of those components. According to this account, computing systems are mechanisms t... [Read more].
  Abstract The mechanistic account of computation proposes that computational explanation is mechanistic, i.e. it explains the behavior and capacities of mechanisms in terms of their components and the functions and organization of those components. According to this account, computing systems are mechanisms that perform computations, that is, they process vehicles according to rules that are sensitive to certain vehicle properties. Despite the emphasis mechanists place on the structural description of mechanisms’ components and activities, the description of computations does not rely on the structural individuation of components and activities, but only on their functional individuation. Concrete computations and their vehicles are not described in terms of detailed structural properties, but are instead characterized in a medium-independent way, that is, independently of the physical medium that implements the computation. Thus, the same specific computation can be implemented in different physical media, allowing the multiple realizability of computational systems. In this paper, I argue that the mechanistic account faces a dilemma. If computations and computational systems are individuated in functional terms, then computational explanations are elliptic mechanistic explanations, or mechanism sketches. But, according to mechanists, mechanism sketches are incomplete and explanatorily weak. Alternatively, for the computational explanation to satisfy the criteria for a good mechanistic explanation, we need a new way to individuate computations based on structural properties. However, as a result of this, multiple real- izability will no longer be possible for computational systems. [Collapse]
• Fodor's Non-Conceptual Representations and the Computational Theory of Mind
  by Mariela Destéfano
  J. CS. 2013, 14(2), 183-214;
  Abstract Fodor (2007; 2008) holds that the very early stages of perceptual processing operate upon non-conceptual representations. In my view, this position is incompatible with the main tenets that Fodor himself (1975; 1998a; 1998b; 2001a) has largely defended in his computational theory of mind (CTM). My a... [Read more].
  Abstract Fodor (2007; 2008) holds that the very early stages of perceptual processing operate upon non-conceptual representations. In my view, this position is incompatible with the main tenets that Fodor himself (1975; 1998a; 1998b; 2001a) has largely defended in his computational theory of mind (CTM). My aim in this paper is to present the problems CTM would face if the modules involved in perceptual processing computed non-conceptual representations. To achieve this, I will offer a trilemma whose first horn consists of the possibility that perceptual modules operate on both non-conceptual representations and representations of the language of thought (LOT). Since non-conceptual representations do not have the necessary properties to figure in a classical computational process, Fodor would have to accept that part of the perceptual modules is not explained in classical computational terms. The second horn of the trilemma is the possibility that perceptual modules may only compute nonconceptual representations. This would be a worst-case scenario, since CTM would then not explain how perceptual modules work. Finally, the last horn of the trilemma presents a third possibility in which perceptual modules operate on both non-conceptual representations and representations that are not fullblown LOT. I will argue that this position is inadequate in that it presents the same difficulties mentioned in the first and second horns of the trilemma.  [Collapse]
• Verbal Repetition and Its Insights on Neurolinguistic Studies: Bridging the Gap between Sound and Speech
  by Sejin Yoo
  J. CS. 2013, 14(2), 215-228;
  Abstract As a window to tap into the human mind, language is a powerful tool, but simultaneously the complexity of language often makes it difficult to grasp how the mind works. It becomes more severe in case of verbal language (or speech), where information is dynamically transferred between speaker and lis... [Read more].
  Abstract As a window to tap into the human mind, language is a powerful tool, but simultaneously the complexity of language often makes it difficult to grasp how the mind works. It becomes more severe in case of verbal language (or speech), where information is dynamically transferred between speaker and listener via relevant transferring medium, i.e. sound waves. In this research report, to overcome the difficulty, we suggest verbal repetition as a simple but promising task capable of revealing how sound becomes speech in the brain. With this, here we briefly reviewed (1) speech representation in the brain; (2) auditory-motor interface and sensorimotor integration; and (3) associative learning and episodic buffer. As described, verbal repetition is effective in tapping into online speech. [Collapse]