Journal

Volume 3, Issue 2 (July 31, 2002)

3 articles

• Categorisation: A Logical Approach to a Cognitive problem
  by Jean-Pierre Descles
  J. CS. 2002, 3(2), 85-137;
  Abstract In classical approach of categorization different problems arise. Non Monotonic Logic, Para-consistant logic Pseudo-consistant Logic, fuzzy set try to give answers for solving these problems. A "logical analysis" of the notions of "typicality" and "atypicality" is presented here in the ways opened b... [Read more].
  Abstract In classical approach of categorization different problems arise. Non Monotonic Logic, Para-consistant logic Pseudo-consistant Logic, fuzzy set try to give answers for solving these problems. A "logical analysis" of the notions of "typicality" and "atypicality" is presented here in the ways opened by cognitive psychology, with the works of E. Rosch and other psychologists (J.-F. Le Ny), by philosophy (with Wittgenstein's "resemblance" and also with the old Aristotelian notion of "essence") and by logicians like Leibniz and Port-Royal in close connexion with linguistic expressions of natural languages. The formalism we propose is called "Logic for Determination of Objects" (LDO). It is developed inside the framework of the sound and general theory of operators of Curry's Combinatory Logic. LDO starts with a formal relation between extension and intension of a concept. A concept is viewed, from Frege, as a function in the set of true-values. We introduce associated to a given concept(i) "the" typical object, which is an abstract object as well as "the best representative instance of the concept" and (ii) a determination function which contributes to give information for referencing objects. The classical Predicate Calculus and classical Semantic Networks in Artificial Intelligence handle only completely determinate objects. In LDO, for a given concept, its extension contains indeterminate as well as more and less determinate instances of the concept and also occurrences (completely determinate instances) of the concept. A typical instance of a concept is an object in its extension; it inherits all properties of the intension. An atypical instance of a concept does not inherit all properties of the intension, only the properties of the "essence" of the concept that is a part of its intension. By these distinctions, it is possible to solve numerous problems of reasoning and to propose later a new framework for analysing the meaning of quantifiers and indefiniteness in natural languages. [Collapse]
• Rules and Intentionality in the Generative Lexicon
  by Pierre Frath
  J. CS. 2002, 3(2), 139-154;
  Abstract This paper examines the notions of rules and intentionality in the Generative Lexicon from a point of view based on Wittgenstein, Kripke and Peirce. It argues that rules cannot explain language because any set of rules must be triggered by another in an endless recess and because rules do not have m... [Read more].
  Abstract This paper examines the notions of rules and intentionality in the Generative Lexicon from a point of view based on Wittgenstein, Kripke and Peirce. It argues that rules cannot explain language because any set of rules must be triggered by another in an endless recess and because rules do not have meaning in themselves and require intentionality at every step of their implementation. Furthermore, it is argued that intentionality cannot be an attribute of the lexicon. An alternative view on lexical meaning inspired from Peirce's semiotics is offered in the final sections. [Collapse]
• Two Types of Logical Structure in Child Language
  by Thomas Hun-tak Lee
  J. CS. 2002, 3(2), 155-182;
  Abstract In this paper, we investigate the emergence of two types of logical elements in child language, nominal quantifiers and focus particles. Quantifier noun phrases such as those in a sentence like A nurse looks after every child exhibit both the subject wide scope and inverse scope readings which are r... [Read more].
  Abstract In this paper, we investigate the emergence of two types of logical elements in child language, nominal quantifiers and focus particles. Quantifier noun phrases such as those in a sentence like A nurse looks after every child exhibit both the subject wide scope and inverse scope readings which are represented by means of operator- variable structures subject to conditions on binding. The relative scope of quantifiers is determined not only by syntactic structure, but by quantifier type and thematic roles. Focus particles like also and only partition the semantic structure of the sentence into a presupposition and an assertion. They induce bound variable structures by creating a variable in the focus position, resulting in an open sentence. First, we examine the availability of scope-dependent interpretations in Mandarin-speaking children, as well as their sensitivity to the scopal effects of quantifier type and thematic hierarchy. Clear theta role effects were found among all age groups, beginning from the four-year-olds, in accordance with the thematic hierarchy. Children were sensitive to the distinction between mei ("every") and suoyou ("all") in their assignment of inverse scope. Our data can be interpreted as evidence in support of approaches to scope that crucially incorporate quantifier type into the structural representation. Secondly, we explore the use of focus particles in two-to three-year-old children whose first language is Cantonese, with both additive and restrictive focus signaled by means of preverbal adverbs and sentence final particles. It was found that additive focus particles were not produced before two years of age, but began to be used before three years old. Restrictive focus markers did not begin to be used spontaneously and productively until shortly after 3;0, emerging later than the additive focus markers, confirming the greater complexity of universal quantification relative to existential quantification. The two studies point to the early emergence of logical structures in children's language. [Collapse]