Journal

Volume 12, Issue 4 (December 31, 2011)

5 articles

• A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
  by David J. Chalmers
  J. CS. 2011, 12(4), 323-357;
  Abstract Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What... [Read more].
  Abstract Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science. [Collapse]
• Beyond Formal Structure: A Mechanistic Perspective on Computation and Implementation
  by Marcin Miłkowski
  J. CS. 2011, 12(4), 359-379;
  Abstract In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue ... [Read more].
  Abstract In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue that it does not suffice to replace Chalmers’ favorite model with a better abstract model of computation; it is necessary to acknowledge the causal structure of physical computers that is not accommodated by the models used in computability theory. Additionally, an alternative mechanistic proposal is outlined. [Collapse]
• Defending the Semantic Conception of Computation in Cognitive Science
  by Gerard O’Brien
  J. CS. 2011, 12(4), 381-399;
  Abstract Cognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various acc... [Read more].
  Abstract Cognitive science is founded on the conjecture that natural intelligence can be explained in terms of computation. Yet, notoriously, there is no consensus among philosophers of cognitive science as to how computation should be characterised. While there are subtle differences between the various accounts of computation found in the literature, the largest fracture exists between those that unpack computation in semantic terms (and hence view computation as the processing of representations) and those, such as that defended by Chalmers (2011), that cleave towards a purely syntactic formulation (and hence view computation in terms of abstract functional organisation). It will be the main contention of this paper that this dispute arises because contemporary computer science is an amalgam of two different historical traditions, each of which has developed its own proprietary conception of computation. Once these historical trajectories have been properly delineated, and the motivations behind the associated conceptions of computation revealed, it becomes a little clearer which should form the foundation for cognitive science. [Collapse]
• Chalmers on Implementation and Computational Sufficiency
  by J. Brendan Ritchie
  J. CS. 2011, 12(4), 401-417;
  Abstract Chalmers (2011) argues for the following two principles: computational sufficiency and computational explanation. In this commentary I present two criticisms of Chalmers’ argument for the principle of computational sufficiency, which states that implementing the appropriate kind of computational str... [Read more].
  Abstract Chalmers (2011) argues for the following two principles: computational sufficiency and computational explanation. In this commentary I present two criticisms of Chalmers’ argument for the principle of computational sufficiency, which states that implementing the appropriate kind of computational structure suffices for possessing mentality. First, Chalmers only establishes that a system has its mental properties in virtue of the computations it performs in the trivial sense that any physical system can be described computationally to some arbitrary level of detail; further argumentation is required to show that the causal topology relevant to possessing a mind actually implements computations. Second, Chalmers’ account rules out plausible cases of implementation due to its requirement of an isomorphism between the state-types of a computation and the physical system implementing the computation. [Collapse]
• Home, Pause, or Break: A Critique of Chalmers on Implementation
  by Brandon N. Towl
  J. CS. 2011, 12(4), 419-433;
  Abstract David Chalmers’s theory of implementation proposes an implementation/ computations relation that supports the theses of computational suf ficiency and computational explanation. These theses face some well known challenges, and so one should expect that a full theory of implementation to meet these ... [Read more].
  Abstract David Chalmers’s theory of implementation proposes an implementation/ computations relation that supports the theses of computational suf ficiency and computational explanation. These theses face some well known challenges, and so one should expect that a full theory of implementation to meet these challenges. In this critique, I show that Chalmers’s theory is silent on some of the important metaphysical details need for such a full account. I then turn to sketching out some of the possible moves and countermoves to be made in providing such details. The intent here is not to refute Chalmers’s theory, but rather to show where much of the hard philosophical works still needs to be done. [Collapse]